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
**IN PURSUIT OF DECISIVE STRATEGIC VICTORIES: The Need to
Enhance the Potential for Successful Strategic Outcomes Through
Effective Planning for Peace Settlement and Peace Building**

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy

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Abstract of

IN PURSUIT OF DECISIVE STRATEGIC VICTORIES: The Need to Enhance the Potential for Successful Strategic Outcomes Through Effective Planning for Peace Settlement and Peace Building

The record of the United States in decisively achieving its strategic goals following military operations has not been consistent and needs improvement. The cause of this inconsistency is the lack of adequate planning for peace settlement and peace building (PS/PB). Military victories, regardless of how decisive or stunning, do not necessarily equate to strategic victory. Astute PS/PB, following military operations, is critical to successful strategic outcomes. This is the best opportunity to shape the peace and the post-conflict world. It offers a chance to sustain the long-term achievement of political goals. The lack of a viable government-wide planning process causes other problems in addition to impeding the successful achievement of strategic goals. It causes funding problems for Unified Combatant Commanders since they are on-scene at the end of the conflict. Commanders must often expend their own resources to conduct missions that are more appropriately performed by civilian agencies. In order to correct this problem, the National Security Council's Interagency Coordination Process should be modified to include Unified Combatant Commanders and Presidential Decision Document #56 should be modified to include armed conflict in the categories eligible for Interagency Coordination. Unified Combatant Commanders should be tasked with the mission to develop in-depth plans for PS/PB for contingency operations plans within their geographical regions. The Departments of State and Defense should establish central strategic victory offices for planning PS/PB and State should lead a government-wide effort to develop integrated plans.

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Introduction

It is the premise of this paper that the record of the United States in decisively achieving its strategic goals following military operations has not been consistent and needs improvement. The paper postulates that the cause of our inconsistency is the lack of adequate planning for peace settlement and peace building (PS/PB). For clarification, a section is included explaining the definitions of Strategic Victory, Peace Settlement, and Peace Building. A discussion of examples of failures to achieve decisive strategic victories following military operations is presented following the definitions. A section discussing why we need improvement is also included. An analysis of two alternatives for improving the potential for successful outcomes is provided: (1) reengineering the government's strategic planning apparatus, and (2) modifying the existing system in support of a more comprehensive and inclusive planning process for (PS/PB). In the conclusion, the paper recommends one of the alternatives and provides a rationale for the choice.

Definitions

Strategic Victory.

"Few wars, in fact, are any longer decided on the battlefield, (if indeed they ever were)...Military victories do not in themselves determine the outcome of wars; they only provide political opportunities for the victors ¹.... "

Simply stated, strategic victory is the achievement of the political goals of a state. It is making the enemy do your will. It requires control or destruction of the enemy's strategic Center of Gravity. The enemy's strategic Center of Gravity is usually its political leadership and/or the will of its people to continue to support fighting. Military victories, regardless of how decisive or stunning, do not necessarily equate to strategic victory, but only contribute to the potential to achieve decisive strategic victory. For decisive victory to be assured, a victorious state's political leadership must succeed in exploiting the opportunities

provided by one or more decisive military victory(s). Decisive military victory is achieved when an enemy's operational Center of Gravity is controlled or destroyed. The operational Center of Gravity is usually one or more of the components of the enemy's military forces, protecting the physical objective of a battle, operation or campaign.

Clausewitz maintains that all wars start out as a rational act. The political purpose of a war provides the rationality. To conduct military operations without a definitive plan or effort for achieving its political (strategic) purpose is folly on the part of any state because it significantly increases the probability that the state will fail in its efforts to decisively achieve its strategic goals.

Peace Settlement.² Successful peace settlement lays the foundation for successful peace building. Peace settlement is a negotiated agreement to end an armed conflict between two warring nations, or political entities. The goal is to maximize the outcome to your nation's advantage by negotiating from a position of strength. In the case where one of the warring nations has won overwhelming military victory, that nation is in a position to dictate the terms and conditions of the peace. Political and military leaders from each side must be present at the negotiations. Armed conflict may continue during the negotiations. It is imperative that the terms and conditions necessary to achieve and sustain the desired end state be predetermined by the political leaders of the victorious nation prior to the negotiations. The terms and conditions of the peace settlement may be incorporated into subsequent formal peace treaties. Ideally, the government of the vanquished nation will accept the terms and conditions of the peace and convince the people of that nation to accept them as well.

¹ Michael Howard, "When Are Wars Decisive?," Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1, Spring, 1999, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 130

² This is the author's definition. It is different from the definition of "peacemaking" as shown in Jjoint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, (Joint Pub 3-07) (Washington, D.C.:June 16, 1995), GL-4. Ppeace settlement refers only to settlements following armed conflict. Peacemaking refers to dispute resolutions with or without prior armed conflict.

The victorious nation or coalition should strive to include the vanquished nation in the peace structure following the end of conflict, if possible. According to John Lewis Gaddis, Professor of History at Yale University, "Peace settlements work best when they include, rather than exclude, former adversaries."³

Peace Building:⁴ "Post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."

Peace building is often considered, incorrectly, only appropriate to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) since its definition is contained in Joint Pub 3-07, concluding that it has no application in a more traditional war. However, the spectrum for peace building ranges from MOOTW to total war and back to MOOTW. In achieving our strategic goals, peace building must be an option for all types of post-conflict situations. However, in the case of war, planning for peace settlement and integrating peace building into the post-armed conflict period should be a mandate.

Peace building is not appropriate to all situations, but should not be dismissed a priori as an option. Generally, peace building is avoided out of fear of the expense, fear of the opportunity costs for alternative uses of the military, and/or fear of being bogged down in any one peace effort over a protracted period. These are all legitimate concerns. However, to dismiss peace building arbitrarily, is to miss important opportunities to achieve strategic goals.

Peace building will usually be initiated by the military since they are the organization on scene, and also because they have the organization and assets to get things done. However, after the initial phases of peace building, the lead for this effort should transition to the State Department and/or other civilian agencies, and the role of the military should transition into one

³ John Lewis Gaddis, "The Senate Should Halt NATO Expansion," *The New York Times* OP-ED, 27 April, 1998

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, (Joint Pub 3-07) (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 1995), GL-4.

of support. In today's world the United States rarely acts alone in armed conflict or peace building, but is usually part of an international or regional effort. This adds to the complexity of planning and executing the peace building mission, but should not be a reason for ignoring it.

Failures of the United States to Achieve Decisive Strategic Victory Following Successful Military Operations

Examples of inadequate outcomes following successful military operations include World War I, the Korean War, and the Gulf War. The settlement ending World War I, the Treaty of Versailles, is notorious for leading to an indecisive outcome. Its harsh terms on Germany and its failure to reconcile the German people to defeat are seen as major causes of World War II. In contrast to World War II, Germany continued to be viewed as the enemy after World War I, and was punished by not being incorporated into the "peace" following that war.

".... Hitler was able to take advantage.....of the pervasive atmosphere of resentment that Germany was treated as a second-class power in the international community. Anger at the inequities of the Treaty of Versailles – especially the "war guilt" clause that blamed Germany alone for the tragedy of World War I, and the reparations requirements,which led to the financial devastation of the German middle class – became political kindling that helped produce the Nazi conflagration. Intransigence on the part of the victorious allies regarding even the most basic and legitimate German objectives ... also produced festering grievances. The allies' myopic policy of alternately treating democratic Weimar Germany as an international nonentity and a probable future aggressor led to tragedy."⁵

Armed conflict ended in the Korean War before a peace settlement was negotiated. As a result, the North Koreans were unwilling to concede to our terms and negotiations were drawn out extensively. Thus, to this day, the two Korean countries remain in an uneasy truce. The truce represents an agreement to suspend fighting, but does not address peace terms and conditions. The United States did not fully achieve its long-term political goals of containment of communism and regional stability at the close of that war. Over time, communism has more or less met its own demise around the world, but North Korea remains a communist nation and a

⁵ Ted Galen Carpenter, NATO Expansion: Playing Russian Roulette, Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars, (Washington, D.C., CATO Institute, 1994) .54.

threat to South Korea and Eastern Asia.

In the Gulf War, when fighting ended, General Schwarzkopf received no guidance from Washington DC⁶ as to desired peace terms. No representative from the White House or the State Department accompanied him to develop the peace terms and conditions. Peace negotiations were treated as a military decision. Schwarzkopf was eager to conclude an agreement that would allow expeditious withdrawal of allied forces. Thus, the focus of talks was on military issues such as prisoners of war, location of minefields, safety measures, and cease-fire lines, and not on strategic outcomes. As part of the final agreement negotiated by Schwarzkopf, the Iraqis were allowed to conduct armed helicopter flights after the war. They used the armed helicopter flights to strike insurgent Shiites who had risen up against Saddam Hussein. In retrospect, the United States failed to exploit its military achievements in the Gulf War and lost the opportunity to secure our strategic goals in the negotiations ending the war. Schwarzkopf promised the Iraqis that the allied forces would not occupy Southern Iraq, which was under allied control at the time. Without such a concession, the United States and its allies could have used the threat of continued occupation in Southern Iraq to press for further demands, force a political accommodation for the Shiites and the Kurds, or even the removal of Saddam Hussein.⁷

Saddam Hussein continues to be capable of threatening the region with Weapons of Mass Destruction and defying United Nations' resolutions. In fact, Saddam himself is considered by many to be the strategic Center of Gravity for that war. The fact that he remains in power is a stark reminder of our failure to achieve a decisive strategic victory.

⁶ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, THE GENERALS' WAR: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, (y, Boston, New York, Toronto and London: Little, Brown and Company, 1995)446.

⁷ Ibid., p. 450

Why Improvement is Needed

Continued failure to achieve decisive strategic victory undermines the will of the American people to support future military operations. Even morale in the military may suffer. Congressional support for continued funding, or even increased funding for sustaining and modernizing the military may be jeopardized. International stature, credibility, and legitimacy in the view of our allies and coalition partners will be seriously damaged. This can lead to a diminishment of our world leadership role, and ultimately, our economy will suffer. Given the dramatic consequences of continued failure to achieve our strategic goals, improvements in capabilities to achieve strategic victory is warranted.

The richest opportunities and the most effective means of achieving our strategic goals, following military operations, lies in astute PS/PB. Despite the criticality of successful PS/PB, it does not appear that the United States government has adequate mechanisms in place to support robust planning for these functions. It is important that terms and conditions for PS that support our strategic goals be predetermined by a nation's (or a coalition's) political leaders prior to cessation of fighting. It is equally important that a post-conflict concept and plan for roles and responsibilities for military and civilian agencies, and for the vanquished nation, be developed prior to peace negotiations. The political leadership must approve this concept and plan. "The untidy end to the conflict (in the Gulf) showed that it is not enough to plan a war. Civilian and military officials must plan for the peace that follows."⁸ A more rigorous and inclusive planning process is integral to improving our capabilities for successfully achieving our strategic goals.

Peace settlement and peace building in the post conflict period are closely interrelated and interdependent. This is because good peace building is not possible without good peace

⁸ Ibid, 476

settlement, and because good peace settlement is not likely to be successful without good peace building. They can be considered as subtasks to the achievement of strategic victory.

History has shown that the performance of our political leaders in planning for the achievement of strategic goals has not always been effective. An example of this can be found in a statement from The Generals' War:

"Their failure to anticipate the upheaval in Iraq, their ignorance of the Shiites, and the White House's ambivalence about committing itself to toppling Saddam Hussein ... reflected the Administration's absence of a clear political strategy for postwar Iraq – all of which was reflected in the negotiations at Safwan."⁹

Even now in the on-going conflict in Kosovo, President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright are often quoted in the press discussing military goals rather than strategic goals. Instead of demanding an exit strategy, the media should be demanding that the Administration articulate its strategic goals for the outcome of the conflict. They should also demand its plan for achieving those goals and its vision and plan for the post-conflict period. An exit strategy would be a natural derivative of such an effort. The failure to clearly articulate strategic goals and a plan for achieving them puts the success of the Kosovo mission at risk.

In Professor Brian Bond's book, "The Pursuit of Victory," he states: "that decisive victory requires at least two other considerations be added to success on the battlefield. Namely, firm realistic statecraft with specific aims, and the willingness of the vanquished to accept the verdict of battle."¹⁰ The essence of this quotation is that political (civilian) leaders must be present at the conclusion of armed conflict in order to negotiate peace terms and post-war conditions, and that the military victory must be overwhelming. The military victory of the United States and its allies in Iraq is often characterized as overwhelming, yet Secretary of State Baker did not arrive in Saudi Arabia until four days after General Schwarzkopf completed the peace negotiations.

⁹ Ibid, 476

Peace settlement and peace building are opportunities afforded to the victors in war. These opportunities allow the victor to assure the achievement of strategic goals (the desired end state) become long lasting and endure. Although strategic victory has tended to elude the United States in the more recent past, this country has been one of the most successful countries in the history of the world in achieving strategic victory. Consider our successes. During World War II, our strategic goal was the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan. Following the capitulation of Germany and Japan and the occupation of these countries by the victorious forces, the United States undertook the redevelopment of Western Europe and Japan. Both benefited by revitalization of their economies and the establishment of democratic-like governments. The Germans and Japanese themselves eventually became participants in the newly established governments, and these governments helped convince the people of the finality of the World War II's outcome.

The Marshall Plan, which was the mechanism for redevelopment of Europe, remains the world's foremost model for assuring stability after military victory. Regional stability in Europe was a strategic goal of the United States for post-war Europe. Europe was our major trading partner. Without redevelopment, the economies and the security of both the United States and Europe would suffer. The Marshall Plan did not just throw money at the problem. The United States and Europe established institutions and an organizational infrastructure for administering the program. Germany, the vanquished nation, was divided and the new political entity of West Germany was included as part of the new world order. Goals were established, progress monitored, and accountability was assigned.

After unconditional surrender by the Japanese government in World War II, General Douglas MacArthur was successful in occupying that country with military forces and

¹⁰ Dr. Brian Pond, The Pursuit of Victory, (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1996), 61.

establishing a new government. This was the mechanism for assuring our decisive victory in the long term because it assured that the Japanese people accepted their defeat, would support the new government, and would participate in the ensuing peace. It virtually eliminated the chance of any resurgence of the former political goals of Japan.

Given the important relationship of PS/PB to strategic victory, it is unwise for the United States to go forward into the future without addressing the need to establish a viable planning process to strengthen our performance in these critical phases. Not to do so is to squander our military achievements and resources.

The lack of a viable government-wide planning process causes other problems in addition to impeding our success in achieving our strategic goals. A viable planning process would also help facilitate the transition of the peace building phase of post-conflict actions to non-military agencies and would foster more efficiency and effectiveness in the use of government resources. During an international humanitarian crisis or during a post conflict period, the military usually has the most robust organization and the most assets, compared to other government agencies present. It is a time when leadership should be vested in the State Department or is transitioning to the State Department, with the military transitioning to a support role. However, because State and other agencies usually have inadequate funding¹¹, the military often is expected to use its assets and funding in lieu of theirs. Since crises are occurring with increasing frequency around the world, this is becoming a significant problem for the military. One dimension of the problem is funding. Continued use of military funding for non-DOD missions diminishes the funding available for other military operations, training, or repair and maintenance. It can also undermine Congressional support to sustain funding for military requirements if Congress views

¹¹ U.S. Agency for International Development webpage, http://www.info.usaid.gov/hum_response/ofda/ Website indicates USAID is responsible for managing Foreign aid, international economic development, environmental sustainability, and

the military as placing a lower priority on its own requirements than those of other agencies. The problem is not only one of funding, but of unclear legal authorities. In some cases, civilian agencies, and not DOD, have clearer legislative or constitutional authority. Even though the money may have been spent in support of worthy goals and objectives, and human emergencies were relieved, the lack of clear legislative or constitutional authority may make it difficult to receive reimbursement later. Still another part of the problem is caused by the Congressional prohibition that DOD not program or budget for contingency operations. However, a significant proportion of the problem is caused by the failure of State and other civilian agencies to properly plan and program for their requirements to execute their responsibilities under the Constitution and the National Security Council's Interagency Coordinating Process. A revised, more inclusive and rigorous government-wide planning process for PS/PB would help mitigate this problem.

Alternative Number 1: Reengineering the Strategic Victory Apparatus of the United States Government

The fundamental message of reengineering is that fragmented (stovepiped) organizations no longer succeed. What succeeds today are organizations that are process oriented, and which have process owners. They are focused on customers and quality products and not inward looking. Work is best performed by teams rather than committees, and organizations should ask themselves the fundamental question, "Why do we do what we do, and why do we do it the way we do it? Reengineering is not about fixing an organization; it is about re-inventing it. The authority and commitment for reengineering must come from the very top of the organization and be sustained.¹²

international humanitarian assistance for the U.S. government. Despite this daunting mission, its budget is only equal to one-half of 1% of the Federal budget.

¹² Michael Hammer and James Champy, Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution, (New York: HarperCollins Publisher, Inc., 1993), Chapter 2.

If the United States government were to apply some of the reengineering concepts mentioned above, it would view the American public as its customer and the achievement of strategic victory following military operations as one of its major products. It would ask itself "Why do we do what we do, and why do we do it the way we do? The answers would be revealing. In the case of conducting military operations, the United States does not always clearly know why it is engaging in military operations. This equates to a lack of vision of the desired end state and a lack of understanding of the political goals to be achieved. In many cases, an analysis of why we make decisions to use military operations the way we do also reveals a confounding answer. The answer, at times, is that this is the way we have always done it, or because bureaucrats wish to maintain the interests of stovepiped organizations controlling individual tasks. No one is responsible for the process as a whole. This situation pertains to the United States at its highest levels with regard to its planning process for achieving decisive strategic outcomes. Put another way, the government is not delivering a quality product (strategic victory) to its customers (the people of the United States).

The Department of State is the lead agency for peace settlement in conjunction with the Department of Defense. The Department of State is also the lead agency for peace building after the transition from the military, with the military in support. However, neither of these agencies has a robust mechanism for planning for PS/PB. The National Security Council's system of committees is responsible for the Interagency Coordinating process, and theoretically could do the planning, but reengineering holds that one person and not a committee must be the process owner. If neither State or Defense is able or willing to take the lead for integrated planning for PS/PB, then Congress should mandate a reorganization, somewhat akin to Goldwater-Nichols, calling for these two departments to establish a joint staff and a joint planning process for PS/PB. It could, alternatively, call for the establishment of an entirely new agency responsible for

strategic victory planning, integrating the inputs from both State and Defense, and other agencies of government.

Alternative Number 2: Improving the Current System

In contrast to the radical reengineering option in Alternative #1, Alternative #2 offers an approach for improving the current system. Assuring the peace normally involves all elements of national power -- diplomatic, economic, military, psychological and informational. This demands a robust, effective planning process with access to all necessary parts of the United States government, including the Unified Combatant Commanders, with designated leadership. However, while the United States currently does not have an adequate integrated planning system for effective PS/PB, it does have many of the pieces. Specific actions needed to improve the current process include:

a. Modifying the National Security Council System of Committees. The National Security Council, which develops National Security policy and makes recommendations to the President on national security issues, has a system of committees. It provides for an Interagency Coordinating Process for developing crisis action plans. This process does not address long-term planning for PS/PB, but could be modified to do so.

Presidential Decision Document (PDD) #56 of May 1997 provides a statement of the Administration's policy for managing Complex Contingency Operations, but it specifically omits international armed conflict.¹³ This omission could be problematic to using the Interagency Coordinating Process for planning for long-term PS/PB following war and some MOOTW. To be effective at achieving strategic goals, PS/PB planning and coordination must start long before the firing has stopped or is about to stop. Ideally, PS/PB planning needs to start before the firing

¹³ Presidential Decision Document (PDD)#56, White Paper on the Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, May, 1997, 1, International armed conflict is specifically omitted. PDD #56 could be improved by

begins and should be an ongoing process. PDD #56 should be modified to include international armed conflict in the categories eligible for the Interagency Coordinating Process.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is a member of the National Security Council and provides advice and recommendations to the Deputies Committee on policies/issues affecting National Security from a military perspective. The system of National Security Committees allows Unified Combatant Commander participation on an exception only basis. The Unified Combatant Commanders do receive guidance from the National Command Authorities to do contingency planning in their geographical areas which address PS/PB. However, PS/PB planning is superficial. This is likely because they do not have the lead responsibility for PS/PB and need other agencies to represent the other elements of national power. Accordingly, it is not likely that adequate advice is being passed through the CJCS to the Deputies Committee for the PS/PB phases.

The system provides that Unified Combatant Commanders may coordinate with the Country Team for any specific country within their regions. However, the Country Team is a mechanism to serve the Ambassador, but only if he chooses. Its composition is at the Ambassador's discretion. Accordingly, not all countries have Country Teams, and when they do, they are not necessarily composed of staff from all the civilian agencies of government that the Unified Combatant Commander may find useful. Therefore, since the geographical Unified Combatant Commanders are not a formal part of the Interagency Coordinating Process, they do not have systematic direct access to other important components of the United States government. Likewise, these other parts of government have no systematic direct access to them. The geographical Unified Combatant Commanders have a view of an entire region, whereas Ambassadors have responsibility for only one country. The Unified Combatant

Commanders have peacetime theatre engagement plans and are one of the best sources of information on a region's culture, history, politics, natural resources, ethnic make-up, and belligerent activity. Joint Pub 3-08, "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations,"¹⁴ and PDD #56 should be amended to include the Unified Combatant Commanders in the Interagency Coordinating Process. In addition, the operational planning process for deliberate and crisis action planning¹⁵ should be amended to include PS/PB.

b. Clarification of State Department Roles and Responsibilities for Strategic Victory Planning. The Secretary of State is a key advisor to the President and a member of the National Security Council and its subordinate committees. Despite this essential role, the State Department does not appear to have any organization designated in its Washington, DC headquarters with the responsibility for overall planning for PS/PB.¹⁶

One reason which might explain the absence of an overall planning office in the State Department is that its Washington bureaucrats wish to defer to the Ambassadors stationed in individual countries as the primary planners for PS/PB. While it is true that the Ambassadors are the personal representatives of the President in their respective countries and they would have an essential role in PS/PB, they usually focus their efforts on peacetime crisis action planning and response. They also service the administrative needs of Americans abroad and dedicate considerable time and effort to building good relationships with the political representatives of the countries to which they are assigned. If long-term planning for PS/PB is left solely to Ambassadors, the State Department, and therefore the United States, will have no systematic

process.

¹⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol 1, (Joint Pub 3-08) (Washington, D.C.: October 9, 1996).

¹⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, (Joint Pub 5-0) (Washington, D.C.: April 13, 1995)

¹⁶ U.S. State Department Webpage, 30 April 1999 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/index.html> Arms Control and International Security/Political Military Affairs. The Bureau of Political Military Affairs is a sub-organization that reports to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. None of the missions listed on this page address post conflict peace planning.

way of integrating issues across a region, since an Ambassador has responsibility for only one country. Additionally, the Ambassadors are political appointees and their expertise leaves the government when they leave. Without a dedicated planning cell in the State Department, the United States government has no way of building an institutional memory on issues of relevance to hot spots around the world to support PS/PB planning. This also means that the State Department will never develop the necessary in-depth information to support programming and budgeting for this function. If State, and other civilian agencies, do not mitigate the funding problem for their responsibilities, the military will be forced to continue funding these activities out of their funds and assets. This will tend to underfund PS/PB, create inefficiencies in the use of government funds, and result in ineffective overall performance. This also diminishes the amount of dollars available for the Unified Combatant Commanders. For instance, General Anthony Zinni, Commander of peace operations in Somalia in the early 1990's, had to establish a police force, a prison system and a judicial system.¹⁷ This is the responsibility of the Justice Department under the Interagency Coordinating Process. It is an example of the failure of that process to accomplish adequate planning for peace building. This is a serious problem and a rigorous planning process across the government is required to arrest this problem before it gets worse.

Some believe that the United States government's role in peace building is adequately addressed via the Agency for International Development, (USAID). USAID has an international mission to support economic development, promote democracy, sustain the environment, and respond to humanitarian crises. However, USAID's annual budget represents only one-half of one percent of the entire Federal budget, which is hardly enough to address all their missions, and adequately address PS/PB planning.

¹⁷ Video tape presentation to Seminar II, May 12, 1999, Naval War College

USAID responds to international emergencies and crises for the U.S. government by writing checks for international government organizations (IGO's), non-governmental organizations (NGO's) and private volunteer organizations (PVO's), who in turn deliver services and commodities to affected populations. This is accomplished mainly through their Office of Foreign Disaster Relief. The IGO's, NGO's and PVO's are not officially committed to the United States government for spending the money in accordance with definitive goals set by the United States. While it is true that many times the goals of the IGO's, NGO's, and PVO's will coincide with those of the United States' government, it cannot be assumed that the IGO's, NGO's and PVO's will always share the same strategic goals as those of the United States. Also, the IGO's, NGO's and PVO's often want to appear impartial in support of their credibility with the local or international community. Although they can be a tremendous source of knowledge on specific countries, they are at times reluctant to share it with the military, fearing the local community will suspect them of providing intelligence. This is not a criticism of US AID, or the NGO's, IGO's and PVO's. They serve a specific purpose and make significant contributions to the easing of crises and emergencies in the world. However, it is a mistake to equate their role to that of having the major responsibility for systematic planning and implementation in support of PS/PB.

The State Department should establish a central office for strategic victory in its headquarters and improve its programming and budgeting for PS/PB. Among the responsibilities of the new office for strategic victory would be leading an integrated planning process across government.

c. Clarification of Defense Department Roles and Responsibilities for Strategic Victory Planning. Although the military is not the lead agency for PS/PB, it has a support role and a vested interest in achieving strategic victory. This vested interest stems from the fact that

it is the military whose blood has purchased the opportunity for strategic victory. However, the Department of Defense, like the State Department, does not appear to have any office or organization in its headquarters dedicated to planning for strategic victory.¹⁸ Because of this omission, the Department of Defense contributes to the United States' overall problem of inadequate planning for strategic victory. In addition, DOD should establish a contingency fund for peace operations in order to prevent continued perturbations in current year funds. The prohibition on contingency funding stems from a time when contingencies were the exception rather than the rule. Clearly, the times have changed. Congress would no doubt oppose such a contingency operations fund, fearing a loss of control of DOD's funding and, even more, a loss of oversight as to when the President decides to use the military. However, if Congress were to understand fully the strong linkage between PS/PB and strategic victory, it is possible they could be persuaded to support such a fund with proper controls to assure their continued oversight.

d. Modification of the Role of Unified Combatant Commanders in Long-Term Planning for Strategic Victory. Joint Pub #3-07 provides that peace building is an appropriate military mission. However, the language is passive and conveys the idea that the military has only a marginal support role. This is inconsistent with the function of peace building and its necessity in achieving strategic victories. Joint Pub #3-07 should be modified to reflect the importance of PS/PB in achieving strategic victory, and the military role should be strengthened to show specific examples of military support roles for building the peace. The Joint Planning Process should also be amended to include PS/PB in the Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning Process.

The inclusion of the Unified Combatant Commanders in the National Security Council system is a critical step in improving planning for PS/PB. The Unified Combatant Commanders

¹⁸ Organizations and Functions for the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), DOD Organization and Functions Guidebook, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ofg/of_usdp.html May 9, 1999

should be tasked with the mission to develop in-depth plans for PS/PB for contingency operations plans within their geographical regions. To assist them in the planning, they should utilize Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations expertise through the support of United States Special Operations Command and the United States Army Special Operations Command. Additionally, the Army should expand its civil affairs and psychological force levels. The plans should be coordinated with the Ambassadors within their regions.

Conclusion

The U.S. needs to better exploit its military victories and resources, and its position as the world's only remaining superpower. To do so, it must rededicate itself to the achievement of strategic goals. This requires a revised, more inclusive, process for effective PS/PB planning to achieve decisive strategic victories. Of the two alternatives presented in this paper for addressing this issue, Alternative #2 is recommended. Alternative #1 rejected it is simply too hard to do. Radical change will be resisted and will threaten the involved agencies making them unwilling to cooperate. This will slow the process down indefinitely. Time and effort will be dedicated to making the reengineered process work, instead of planning for strategic victory. If Alternative #2 is implemented successfully, it can have the desired dramatic effect of providing integrated planning for PS/PB and improving the potential for successful strategic outcomes. It will require a commitment to expend the necessary resources by all the appropriate civilian and military agencies in government. A modification of government organizations, processes, and doctrine in the national security arena, and the establishment of a new tsar in charge of strategic victory planning, will be required. As a matter of institutionalized national policy, the United States must refocus its resources, doctrines, and organizations to promote in-depth planning to enhance its opportunities for success in achieving decisive strategic victories.

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